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1 Introduction
In a committee, a voting rule species the decision-making procedure, that is,
when a proposal is to be accepted or rejected depending on the resulting vote
conguration. The vote conguration itself depends on di¤erent options o¤ered
to committee members. A very huge class of voting rules studied in the literature
deals with simple games. In such voting models, any voter either votes for or
against the proposal. If a voter does not favor a proposal, then he is considered to
be against, that is, an abstention if any, is treated as a vote against the proposal.
It is well known however that many decision-making processes including relative
majority, vote in the United Nations Senate cannot be tted in such models.
To handle this shortcoming, models of voting games with abstention (VGA)
were introduced (Rubinstein [26] dened social decision systems, Felsenthal and
Machover ([9] and [10]) dened Ternary Voting Game), where each player is
allowed three distinct votes but the outcome of the vote still has two options.
An important but isolated earlier work on abstention can be found in Fishburns
book [11]. More recently, Freixas and Zwicker [12] extended VGAs to the so-called
(j; k) games, a subclass of which are (j; 2) games in which voters have j possible
ordered levels of approval in the input, thus partitioning the committee N into j
coalitions, each attached to a winning or losing character in the output. Simple
games constitute the class of (2; 2) simple games whereas VGAs constitute the
class of (3; 2) simple games.
A fundamental question is the assessment of the inuence of each voter to
a¤ect the outcome of a vote. Several power indices for simple games have so
far been dened to capture the ability of the players to a¤ect the voting out-
come. The two most conspicuous representatives of this line of research are the
Shapley-Shubik (SS) power index [27] and the Banzhaf and Coleman (BC) power
indices ([2] and [6]) originally dened in voting rules modelled by simple games.
In a quite distinct direction, the desirability relation (introduced by Isbell [21]
and extensively studied by Taylor [29]) rank directly players according to their
inuence. Previous work by Felsenthal and Machover [9] and Di¤o Lambo and
Moulen [8] show that all these power theories are ordinally equivalent in the class
of swap-robust simple games.
In order to capture the ordering of the inuence held by the players in a game,
the concept of hierarchy was introduced by Friedman et al [20]. For example, a
ve-player game G has hierarchy (1; 3; 1) means that one player has less inuence
than all the others, one player has more, and the other three players have the
same inuence as each other, they are equivalent. From works by Friedman et
al [20] and Freixas and Pons [17] on hierarchies, it can be stated that given any
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complete pre-ordering dened on a nite set of more than 5 voters, it is possible
to construct a simple game such that the pre-orderings induced by SS [27] and the
BColeman ([2] and [6]) power indices coincide with the given pre-ordering (when
the number of voters is 5 or less, there are four non achievable hierarchies). These
results hold under the condition that the game be modeled by a simple game.
With respect to the construction of the hierarchies, recently, Bishnu and Roy [4]
have shown how to use minimal winning coalitions to extract the hierarchy of
players.
This paper deals with voting games with abstention. The question of achiev-
able hierarchies is relevant thanks to the fact that SS and BC indices have all
been clearly generalized to VGA by Felsenthal and Machover [9] while the Cole-
man index has been generalized to VGA by Freixas [15]. They have moreover
been generalized to the most general model of (j; k) games by Freixas ([13] and
[14]). On the other hand, the desirability relation has been dened by Tchantcho
et al [31] in terms of I-inuence relation. These authors showed that the SS, BC
and the I-inuence relation are ordinally equivalent in the subclass of equitable
swap-robust games. Recently, Parker [24] showed that this ordinal equivalence
holds in the whole class of swap-robust games.
With respect to hierarchies, we show in this paper that all hierarchies are
achievable. More precisely, the four hierarchies cited above that were not achiev-
able for simple games (when abstentions are not permitted to players) are achiev-
able in a particular class of weighted games, the class of zero-centered strongly
weighted VGA. This is a renement of Parkers result [24]. Weighted games
as well as the characterization of this class of games were given by Freixas and
Zwicker in [12].
Freixas et al [18] noticed some shortcoming in the I-inuence. There are
weighted games not being complete for the inuence relation, something di¤erent
to what occurs for simple games. They introduced several extensions of the
desirability relation (see also Pongou et al [25]) by considering each condition
in the denition of I-inuence relation. A stronger form of I-completeness is
H-completeness for which all the relations that intervene in the denition of
completeness coincide. In this paper we also address the problem of achievable
H-hierarchies. We show in particular that no strict hierarchy is achievable for
games with 2 or 3 players. For games with 4 players, except the strict hierarchy
for which we do not get any answer, all other hierarchies are achievable. For
games with more than 5 players, the strict hierarchy is achievable in the class of
H-complete (3; 2) games. Furthermore, unlike the subclass of hierarchies (m; 1; 1)
with m  2, all other H-hierarchies are achievable.
Determining importance rankings is a signicant issue in operational research.
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The study of ordinal preferences involves a variety of elds, including tourna-
ment theory, multiple criteria decision modeling (MCDM), and data envelopment
analysis of qualitative data. As stated in the survey by Cook [7], the notion of
voter power or relative importance has been largely ignored in studies on ordinal
ranking problems, although if a tangible estimate of voter importance exists, then
these voters can be treated like criteria in an MCDM problem. The approach in
our paper is useful in ranking voters in voting institutions where abstention is
allowed as a third input. Examples of application of our results naturally apply to
political institutions, but also in management enterprisers and even in reliability
systems where voters are replaced by device components with three input levels.
Examples in these di¤erent contexts can be found in: Levitin [22], Obata and
Ishii [23], AlonsoMeijide et al. [1], Sueyoshi et al. [28] or Freixas et al. [16].
The paper is organized as follows.
The technical background as well as some useful results are recalled in section
2. In section 3, we recall several notion of desirability for (3; 2) games and consider
as well their completeness, their link with weightedness. In section 4 we prove that
all hierarchies induced by the inuence relation are achievable in the particular
class of weighted (3; 2) games, the class of zero-centered strongly weighted VGA.
As for H-hierarchies a partial study is done in section 5 and a conclusion then
ends the paper.
2 Preliminaries
An ordered 3-partition ofN (set of voters or players) is a sequence S = (S1; S2; S3)
of mutually disjoint subsets of N whose union is N . In S, S1 stands for the set
of yes voters, S2 for abstainers and S3 stands for no voters. We denote by 3N the
set of all ordered 3-partitions of N . For S; S 0 2 3N , we write S 3 S 0 if S can be
transformed into S 0 by shifting one or more voters to higher levels of approval.
Denition 2.1 A (3; 2) game G = (N; V ) consists of a nite set N of voters to-
gether with a value function V : 3N  ! f0; 1g such that for all ordered 3-partition
S; S 0, if S 3 S 0 then V (S) = 1 implies V (S 0) = 1.
A 3-partition S such that V (S) = 1 is said to be winning. A (3; 2) game can
be dened by its set of winning 3-partitions, W = fS 2 3N : V (S) = 1g. In
that case we denote the game by (N;W ). In voting, it is often demanded that
V be exhaustive, then from the monotonicity demanded to V , V (N ) = 0 and
V (M) = 1 where N andM are respectively the 3-partitions with N3 = N and
M1 = N . A special type of (3; 2) simple games is the class of anonymous or
symmetric games which have been intensively studied in [19]. Anonymous (3; 2)
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games are games for which for all 3-partition S, S is winning if and only if for all
permutations  : N ! N , (S) = ((S1); (S2); (S3)) is winning.
Denition 2.2 In a (3; 2) game, a 3-partition S is said minimal winning if S
is winning and for all T 2 3N such that T 3 S; T is losing. As well, S is said
maximal losing if S is losing and for all T 2 3N such that S 3 T; T is winning.
Either the set of minimal winning 3-partitions or the set of maximal losing
3-partitions completely generates the game. Next, we introduce weighted (3; 2)
games, which is a special type of weighted (j; k) games introduced in [12].
Denition 2.3 Let G = (N; V ) be a (3; 2) game. A representation of G as a
(3; 2) weighted game consists of a sequence w = (w1; w2; w3) of 3 weight functions,
where wi : N  ! R for each i with w1 (p)  w2 (p)  w3 (p) for each p 2 N ,
together with a real number Q so called quota such that for any 3-partition S, S
is winning if and only if w (S) =
3P
i=1
P
p2Si
wi (p)  Q.
According to this denition we can normalize, i.e. assign a zero weight, to
any level of approval. Here we are mainly concerned with games with abstention
for which we can normalize the weights at any of the three input levels, but we
choose the abstention" level which seems to be quite natural. If a null weight is
assigned to abstainers, then a non-negative weight is assigned to yes" voters and
a non-positive weight to no" voters. Thus, a weight1 w(p) = (w+(p); 0; w (p))
with w+(p)  0 and w (p)  0 is assigned to each p 2 N . The only requirement
for the threshold Q, if the (3; 2) game is demanded to be exhaustive, is
w(N ) = w(;; ;; N) =
X
p2N
w (p) < Q 
X
p2N
w+(p) = w(N; ;; ;) = w(M):
The previous denition can now be rewritten as follows.
Denition 2.4 A (3; 2) game (N;W ) is a weighted (3; 2) game if there exists a
sequence of weight functions (w+; 0; w ) with w (p)  0  w+(p) for all p 2 N ,
and a quota Q such that for all S = (S1; S2; S3) 2 3N ,
S 2 W () w(S) = P
p2S1
w+(p) +
P
p2S3
w (p)  Q.
Two consecutive stronger conditions of a weighted (3; 2) game are the two
following which were introduced in [12] :
1We are identifying w+ with w1, 0 with w2 and w  with w3 in Denition 2.4.
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Denition 2.5 - A strongly weighted (3; 2) game is a weighted (3; 2) game that
admits a representation such that for every pair of voters p and r,
[w+(p)  w+(r); w (p)   w (r)] or [w+(p)  w+(r); w (p)   w (r)].
- A zero-centered strongly weighted (3; 2) game is a strongly weighted (3; 2)
game that admits a representation with weights w+(p) =  w (p) for each p 2 N .
3 Various inuence relations on the set of voters
We recall here the inuence relation dened in [31].
Denition 3.1 Let G = (N; V ) be a (3; 2) game, p; r 2 N : p is said to be at
least as inuential as r, denoted p %I r, if for all (S1; S2; S3) 2 3N it yields :
 V (S1 [ fpg; S2 n fpg; S3)  V (S1 [ frg; S2 n frg; S3) if p; r 2 S2;
 V (S1; S2 [ fpg; S3 n fpg)  V (S1; S2 [ frg; S3 n frg) if p; r 2 S3; and
 V (S1 [ fpg; S2; S3 n fpg)  V (S1 [ frg; S2; S3 n frg) if p; r 2 S3:
G is I-complete if either p %I r or r %I p for all pair p; r 2 N .
The I-inuence relation which is clearly a generalization of the desirability
relation for simple games to (3; 2) games, is reexive, but is neither complete
nor transitive in general. However, there exist weighted (3; 2) games that are
not complete under the I-inuence relation. Although I-completeness is not
consistent for the notion of weighted (3; 2) games, it was shown in [18] that it
is for the notion of strongly weighted (3; 2) games. The I-inuence is indeed
too demanding. In [18], the three separate condition of the I-inuence has been
studied thus introducing a new class of complete games.
Denition 3.2 Let (N; V ) be a (3; 2) game. Let p; r 2 N :
(i) D+-desirability. p %D+ r if and only if for all 3-partition S = (S1; S2; S3)
such that both p and r belong to S2, V (S1 [ fpg; S2 n fpg; S3)  V (S1 [
frg; S2 n frg; S3).
(ii) D -desirability. p %D  r if and only if for all 3-partition S = (S1; S2; S3)
such that both p and r belong to S3, V (S1; S2 [ fpg; S3 n fpg)  V (S1; S2 [
frg; S3 n frg).
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(iii) D-desirability. p %D r if and only if for all 3-partition S = (S1; S2; S3)
such that both p and r belong to S3, V (S1 [ fpg; S2; S3 n fpg)  V (S1 [
frg; S2; S3 n frg).
Of course, V (S1[fpg; S2 nfpg; S3)  V (S1[frg; S2 nfrg; S3) is equivalent to
assert that (S1 [ frg; S2 n frg; S3) 2 W implies that (S1 [ fpg; S2 n fpg; S3) 2 W .
And analogously for the two next inequalities in Denition 3.2.
In general, none of the three separate relations, %D+, %D  and %D are
transitive. The notion of completeness induced for the three separate relations
considered in Denition 3.2 and two additional ones are recalled below.
Denition 3.3 Let G = (N; V ) a (3,2) game.
(i) G is D+-complete if either p %D+ r or r %D+ p for all p; r 2 N .
(ii) G is D -complete if either p %D  r or r %D  p for all p; r 2 N .
(iii) G is D-complete if either p %D r or r %D p for all p; r 2 N .
(iv) G is complete if it is D+-complete, D -complete and D-complete.
(v) G is hierarchically complete or H-complete, denoted by %H , if it is complete
and the total rankings induced by %D+, %D  and %D coincide.
Note that even if a (3; 2) game is complete the total rankings given by %D+,
%D  and%D can be di¤erent. The inclusion relations among the di¤erent classes
of (3; 2) games considered above can be summarized as follows.
H-complete  I-complete  Complete
[ [
Zero-centered strongly weighted  Strongly weighted  Weighted
Anonymous (3; 2) games are the simplest subclass of (3; 2) games being
H-complete and therefore I-complete and complete. These (3; 2) games are the
only ones with a unique equivalence class and therefore all players are hierarchi-
cally equivalents. Somewhat curious, and contrarily to what happens for simple
games, is that some (3; 2) anonymous games are not necessarily weighted, see [19]
and [32] for a characterization of anonymous weighted (3; 2) games. However, if
an anonymous (3; 2) game is weighted it is zero-centered strongly weighted.
Sections 4 and 5 are devoted to the study of achievable hierarchies for I-complete
and H-complete games respectively.
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4 I-hierarchies
This section is devoted to the study of the existence of achievable hierarchies
for I-complete (3; 2) games. The study of hierarchies within the class of simple
games can be traced back to Friedman et al. [20] and continued by Bean et al. [3],
even though it is also an implicit study in Carreras and Freixas [5]. Indeed,
in Friedman et al. [20] it is proved that complete simple games and, particularly,
weighted simple games showmany di¤erent hierarchies, although two sequences of
hierarchies are never achievable. Freixas and Pons [17] proved that all hierarchies
are achievable in the class of weakly complete games as long as the number of
voters is greater than 5. For less than 6 voters, only four hierarchies are not
achieved in this class of games, and they are : (1; 1; 1); (1; 1; 1; 1), (2; 1; 1) and
(2; 1; 1; 1). But none of these four hierarchies is achieved either in any other
kind of simple games. As a consequence of these results we can state that, given
any complete pre-ordering dened on a nite set of voters (with more than ve
elements), it is possible to construct a simple game such that the preorderings
induced by Shapley-Shubik [27] and the Banzhaf and Coleman ([2] and [6]) power
indices coincide with the given pre-ordering.
Denition 4.1 Let G = (N;W ) be a (3; 2) game and % be a pre-ordering on N .
We say that the sequence (m1; :::;mt) with
tP
i=1
mi = n is achievable for % if there
are t equivalence classes A1,..., At for % which form a partition of N with m1,
..., mt voters respectively and p  r whenever p 2 Ai, r 2 Aj with i < j.
Note that at most there are 2n 1 di¤erent hierarchies for games with n voters.
Parker [24] proves that all hierarchies for ternary voting games are achievable
in the class of I-complete games. The purpose of this section is to prove that
all hierarchies are achievable in the subclass of zero-centered strongly weighted
games. For that, we will need the following result that was proved in [18], that
establishes some links between weights and desirability relations for (3; 2) games.
Proposition 4.2 Given two arbitrary players p and r in a weighted (3; 2) game,
for any weight function representing it, we have :
(i) w+(p)  w+(r)) p %D+ r.
(ii)  w (p)   w (r)) p %D  r.
(iii) w+(p)  w (p)  w+(r)  w (r)) p %D r.
Theorem 4.3 All I-hierarchies are achievable in the class of zero-centered strongly
weighted (3; 2) games.
8
Proof : Following Friedman et al. [20]s result for simple games, all D-hierarchies
are achievable for weighted simple games except the two sequences : (m; 1; 1; 1)
and (m; 1; 1) for m  1. Hence, there exist suitable weighted (2; 2) games cer-
tifying all achievable hierarchies for %D. We assume in what follows that the
weighted representations chosen for these weighted games assign the same weights
to equally-desirable voters for the %D relation, i.e. if i %D j and j %D i (or
i D j) if and only if wi = wj.
Let (m1; : : : ;mt) be a given hierarchy with
Pt
k=1mk = n and di¤erent of
(m; 1; 1; 1) and (m; 1; 1) for all m  1. Then it exists a weighted simple game
with weighted representation [Q;w1; w2; : : : ; wn] such that wi > wj if and only if
i D j and wi = wj if and only if i D j, and with (m1; : : : ;mt) as a hierarchy.
From each of these weighted representations we dene a zero-sum strongly
weighted (3; 2) voting game as follows : the quota is Q and the weights for voters
are w(i) = (wi; 0; wi) for all i 2 N .
If i D j (equivalently to wi > wj according to the selection of weights done)
we have V (S1[fig; S2 nfig; S3)  V (S1[fjg; S2 nfjg; S3) for all 3-partition with
i; j 2 S2 since w+(i) = wi > wj = w+(j) which implies w(S1 [fig; S2 n fig; S3) =
(wi  wj) +w(S1 [ fjg; S2 n fjg; S3) > w(S1 [ fjg; S2 n fjg; S3). Note, moreover,
that each minimal winning bipartition for the simple game (S;N nS) induces the
minimal winning 3-partition (S;NnS; ;) for the (3; 2) game, and as i D j it exists
at least a bipartition (S;N nS) with i; j =2 S such that w(S[fig; (N nS)nfig)  Q
and w(S[fjg; (N nS)nfjg) < Q. Thus, the induced 3-partition (S;N nS; ;) with
i; j =2 S veries w(S1[fig; (N nS)nfig)  Q and w(S1[fjg; (N nS)nfjg) < Q.
Hence, i D j for the simple game if and only if i D+ j for the (3; 2) game.
Furthermore, as the (3; 2) game is zero-centered strongly weighted, we have
i %D j and i %D  j whenever i D j (or, equivalently, i D+ j), since wi  
( wi) > wj   ( wj) and 0  ( wi) > 0  ( wj) respectively.
If i D j (equivalently to wi = wj according to the selection of weights done)
we have i D j for the simple game if and only if i D+ j, i D  j and i D j
if and only if i I j for the (3; 2) game. In other words, relation %D for the
simple game coincides with the inuence relation %I for the (3; 2) game.
Now it remains to prove that the two sequences (m; 1; 1; 1) and (m; 1; 1) for
m  1 are also achievable in the class of zero-centered strongly weighted (3; 2)
games.
 Proof for (m; 1; 1; 1).
Consider the zero-centered strongly game with n voters with quota Q = 1
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and weights :
w(a) = (1; 0; 1); w(b) = (2; 0; 2); w(c) = (3; 0; 3); w(di) = (4; 0; 4)
where i = 1; : : : ; n  3. By Proposition 4.2 it follows :
di %I c %I b %I a:
It only remains to prove that these rankings are strict. However, one may
easily check, by choosing convenient 3-partitions that
di = D+c; c = D+b; b = D a
Hence,
di I c I b I a
and the I-hierarchy (m; 1; 1; 1) is achievable for this zero-centered strongly
weighted (3; 2) game.
 Proof for (m; 1; 1).
Consider the zero-centered strongly game with n voters with quota Q = 2
and weights :
w(a) = (1; 0; 1); w(b) = (2; 0; 2); w(ci) = (3; 0; 3)
where i = 1; : : : ; n  2. By Proposition 4.2 it follows :
ci %I b %I a:
It only remains to prove that these rankings are strict. One may easily
check, by choosing convenient 3-partitions that
ci = D+b; b = D+a
Hence,
ci I b I a
and the I-hierarchy (m; 1; 1) is achievable for this zero-centered strongly
weighted (3; 2) game. 
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5 H-hierarchies
In this section, we partially address the problem of existence of achievable hier-
archies for H-complete (3; 2) games.
The following notations are useful.
Notation 5.1 Given a subset A of N , a voter b 2 A, a 3-partition S = (S1; S2; S3)
of N; p; r 2 N and x =2 N; we denote by :
 pr the transposition of voters p and rof N .
 T = S n frg the 3-partition of N n frg such that : 8i 2 f1; 2; 3g; Ti =
Si if r =2 Si
Si n frg if r 2 Si
 Tx (S;A) the 3-partition T of N [ fxg such that :(
x 2 Tt where t = min
i2f1;2;3g
fi : A \ Si 6= ;g,
and the level of approval of every player of N in T is the same as in S.
 Tx (b; S; A) the 3-partition T of N [ fxg such that :(
x 2 Ti if b 2 Si and b 2 Tk where k = min
i2f1;2;3g
fi; (A n fbg) \ Si 6= ;g,
and the level of approval of every player of N n fbg in T is the same as in S.
The 2-player case : It is obvious that when there are only two voters, the hi-
erarchy  is achievable meanwhile the strict hierarchy  is not.
The 3-player case : This case is solved in the following result.
Proposition 5.2 For n = 3, the H-hierarchies (3) and (2; 1) are achievable
meanwhile H-hierarchies (1; 1; 1) and (1; 2) are not achievable.
Proof : First, it is obvious that the following H-complete (3; 2) games achieve
the H-hierarchies (3) and (2; 1) respectively. Let N = fa; b; cg :
for the hierarchy (3), take Wm = f(abc; ;; ;)g and for (2; 1), consider the set
Wm = f(a; b; c); (b; a; c)g.
Now, assume that there is a 3-player (3; 2) game with N = fa; b; cg such
that a H b H c: Then there exist three 3-partitions A, B, C of N such that :
a 2 A1\B1, b 2 A2\C1, c 2 B2\C2; A;B;C 2 W and ab(A); ac(B); bc(C) =2
W .
First case : c 2 A3
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First, let us assume that b 2 B3. If a 2 C3; then A = (a; b; c), B = (a; c; b)
and C = (b; c; a) which implies ab(A) = ac(C): ac(C) 2 W since C 2 W and
a H c meanwhile ab(A) =2 W ; it is a contradiction. If a 2 C2; then A = (a; b; c),
B = (a; c; b) and C = (b; ac; ;). We will show in this condition that b D  c.
It su¢ ces to show that c %D  b. Let S be a 3-partition such that b; c 2 S3
and assume that (S1; S2 [ fbg; S3 n fbg) 2 W . Since none of the 3-partitions
(;; ab; c) and (;; b; ac) is winning, we must have (S1; S2 [ fbg; S3 n fbg) = (a; b; c)
and therefore (S1; S2 [ fcg; S3 n fcg) = (a; c; b) = B 2 W . Thus, c %D  b and
by hypothesis, b H c implying that b %D  c. Finally, b D  c which is a
contradiction. If a 2 C1; it can easily be shown that b D  c; which is once again
a contradiction.
Second, let us assume that b 2 B2. If a 2 C3; then ab(A) = ac(C) 2 W
since C 2 W and a H c. However, ab(A) =2 W and this is a contradiction. If
a 2 C2; then we have a D  c; which is a contradiction. If a 2 C1; then we have
a D  c; which is also a contradiction.
Finally, let us assume that b 2 B1. If a 2 C3; then ab(A) = ac(C) 2 W
since C 2 W and a H c. However, ab(A) =2 W and this is a contradiction. If
a 2 C2; then the contradiction follows and if a 2 C1; then bc(C)  A 2 W: It is
a contradiction.
Second case : c 2 A2 [ A1.
If a 2 C3 [ C2; then it can be checked that ab(A)  C 2 W , which is a
contradiction because ab(A) =2 W .
If a 2 C1; then bc(C)  A 2 W , a contradiction because bc(C) =2 W .
Hence, for n = 3 the H-strict hierarchy is not achievable.
We can prove analogously that the H-hierarchy (1; 2) is not achievable. 
We give in Table 1 some examples of strongly weighted (3; 2) games and the
H-hierarchies induced by these games, where Wm denotes the set of minimal
winning tripartitions.
In the sequel we consider the cases n  4. We need the following important
lemma.
Lemma 5.3 If anH-hierarchy (m1; :::;mi; :::; mt) is achievable then theH-hierarchy
(m1; :::;mi + 1; :::;mt) is achievable as well.
Proof : Let (N;W ) be a (3; 2) game that achieves the H-hierarchy (m1; :::;mi; :::;
mt). Let Ai the set of the mi equivalent players in the preceding H-hierarchy and
let N 0 = N [ fxg:
W 0 = fT 2 3N 0 : 9 (b; S) 2 Ai W; T = Tx (S;Ai) or T = Tx (b; S; Ai) g.
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Wm Q w(a) w(b) w(c) w(d) H-hierarchy
(a; b; c) and (b; a; c) 1 (1; 0; 1) (1; 0; 1) (0; 0; 0)  a  b  c
(a; cd; b) ; (a; b; cd) ;
(b; ac; d) ; (b; ad; c) ;
(cd; a; b) ; (ac; ;; bd) ;
and (ad; ;; bc)
1 (5; 0; 5) (3; 0; 3) (2; 0; 2) (2; 0; 2) a  b  c  d
(b; ac; d) ; (b; ad; c) ;
(a; c; bd) ; (c; ab; d) ;
(a; b; cd) and (c; ad; b)
0 (3; 0; 3) (2; 0; 2) (2; 0; 2) (0; 0; 1) a  b  c  d
(a; b; cd) ; (a; d; bc) ;
(a; c; bd) ; (cd; a; b) ;
(bd; a; c) and (bc; a; d)
1 (3; 0; 3) (1; 0; 1) (1; 0; 1) (1; 0; 1) a  b  c  d
Table 1: Examples of achievable H-hierarchies.
We will show that (N 0;W 0) achieves the H-hierarchy (m1; :::;mi + 1; :::;mt).
Let Bi = Ai [ fxg and Bj = Aj for all j 2 f1; :::; i  1; i+ 1; :::; tg :
Let us consider p 2 Bk; r 2 Bj; k  j:
It is obvious that if k = j then p and r are equivalent. In the sequel we assume
with no loss of generality that k < j:
First case : j 6= i and k 6= i:
There exists a 3-partition S 2 W such that p 2 S1; r 2 S2 and pr(S) =2 W;
since p D+ r in (N;W ) :
We have T = Tx(S;Ai) 2 W 0: If pr(T ) 2 W 0, then pr(T n fxg) 2 W , which
is a contradiction since pr(T n fxg) = pr(S): Thus, pr(T ) =2 W 0 and hence,
p D+ r in (N 0;W 0) : Similarly, we have p D  r and p D r in (N 0;W 0) :
Second case : j = i and k 6= i:
First, assume that r 6= x. There exists a 3-partition S 2 W such that :
p 2 S1, r 2 S2 and pr(S) =2 W , since p D+ r in (N;W ). T = Tx(S;Ai) 2 W 0. If
9a 2 Bi n fxg; a 2 S1; then pr(T ) 2 W 0 implies that pr(T n fxg) 2 W , which is
a contradiction since pr(T n fxg) = pr(S): Thus, pr(T ) =2 W 0: If Bi \ S1 = ?;
then Bi \ pr(T1) = frg and pr(T ) =2 W 0; ( see the denition of W 0 ). Hence,
p D+ r in (N 0;W 0). Similarly, we have p D  r and p D r in (N 0; W 0) :
Second, assume that r = x. Let b 2 Bi : b 6= x: There exists a 3-partition
S 2 W such that p 2 S1, b 2 S2 and pb(S) =2 W; since p D+ b in (N; W ) :
Then, T = Tx(b; S; Ai) 2 W 0: If 9a 2 Bi n fxg; a 2 S1, then px(T ) 2 W 0
implies px(T nfxg) 2 W ( by the denition of W 0). This is a contradiction since
px(T n fxg) = pb(S), thus px(T ) =2 W 0:
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If Bi \ S1 = ;; then, Bi \ px(T1) = fxg and px(T ) =2 W 0 (by the denition
of W 0). Hence, p D+ x in (N 0;W 0).
Likewise, p D  x and p D x in (N 0;W 0).
Third case : If j 6= i and k = i.
First, assume that p 6= x: There exists a 3-partition S 2 W such that p 2 S1,
r 2 S2 and pr(S) =2 W since p D+ r in (N;W ) : We have T = Tx(S;Ai) 2 W 0.
If 9a 2 Bi n fx; pg ; a 2 S1; then pr(T ) 2 W 0 implying that pr(T n fxg) 2 W .
This is a contradiction since pr(T n fxg) = pr(S) : thus pr(T ) =2 W 0: If
Bi \ S1 = fpg ; Then pr(T ) =2 W 0 ( see the denition of W 0 ) hence, p D+ r in
(N 0;W 0). Likewise, p D  r and p D r in (N 0;W 0):
Now assume that p = x: Let b 2 Bi; b 6= x: There exists a 3-partition S 2 W
such that : b 2 S1; r 2 S2 and br(S) =2 W; since b D+ r in (N; W ) : We have
T = Tx(S; Ai) 2 W 0. If 9a 2 Bi n fx; bg ; a 2 S1; then xr(T ) 2 W 0 implies
S 0 2 W , where S 0 is the 3-partition of N such that : b 2 S 02, r 2 S 01 and every
player of N n fb; rg has the same level of approval in S 0 and xr(T ): This is a
contradiction since S 0 = br(S); thus xr(T ) =2 W 0.
If Bi \ S1 = fbg ; then xr(T ) =2 W 0 ( see denition of W 0). Hence, x D+ r
in (N 0;W 0).
Similarly, we have x D  r and x D r in (N 0;W 0). 
Proposition 5.4 For n = 4, anyH-hierarchy distinct from (1; 1; 1; 1) and (2; 1; 1)
is achievable.
Proof : - The H-hierarchies (4), (3; 1), and (2; 2) are achievable thanks to the
lemma 5:3 above and the fact that (3) and (2; 1) are achievable H-hierarchies.
- It can be seen from table 1 above that the H-hierarchies (1; 3), (1; 2; 1) and
(1; 1; 2) are achievable. 
Proposition 5.5 For n  5, the strict H-hierarchy (1; 1; :::; 1) is achievable.
Proof : Assume that n  5 and consider the following (3; 2) game (N;W ) where
N = fx1; x2; ...; xn 1; xng and the set of minimal winning 3-partitions is given
by :
Wm =
8>>>><>>>>:
(fxag; N n fxa; xbg; fxbg) ; a; b 2 f1; :::; ng a < b, b =2 fa+ 2; a+ 3 : a  n  3g;
(fxig; N n fxi; xi+2; xi+3g; fxi+2; xi+3g) ; i = 1; :::; n  3;
(fxn 2; xn 4g; N n fxn 4; xn 3; xn 2; xng; fxn; xn 3g) ;
(fxn 1g; N n fxn 1g; ;) ;
(fx3; x4; x5g; N n fx2; x3; x4; x5g; fx2g)
9>>>>=>>>>; :
It is obvious that the game above achieves the strict H-hierarchy
(x1  x2  :::  xn 1  xn). 
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Theorem 5.6 For all t 2 N; t  5, the H-hierarchy (m1; m2; :::; mt) with
mi  1; 1  i  t is achievable.
Proof : Considering the preceding Proposition and Lemma 5:3, the proof of this
theorem is straighforward. 
The study of H-hierarchies can be summarized as follows.
 The H-hierarchies (1; 1), (1; 2) and (1; 1; 1) are not achievable.
 Nothing have been said for H-hierarchies (1; 1; 1; 1) and (m; 1; 1) for any
m  2 and
 All other H-hierarchies are achievable.
6 Conclusion
The paper at hand deals with voting rules with abstention also called (3; 2) games,
a voting game that strictly includes the class of simple games. The I-inuence
relation introduced by Tchantcho et al [31] is a generalization of the desirabil-
ity relation originally dened in simple games. It coincides with the extension
of Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf and Coleman indices dened by Felsenthal and
Machover [9] and later on reconsidered in a general framework by Freixas ([13]
and [14]) in the class of swap-robust (3; 2) games. Unlike in simple games, all
hierarchies are achievable in the class of I-complete (3; 2) games, that is, in the
class of swap-robust games. Moreover, given any hierarchy, there exists a basic
weighted (3; 2) game that achieves that hierarchy.
In this paper, we point out some achievable and non achievable hierachies
in the class of H-complete (3; 2) games, a class of game recently introduced by
Freixas et al [18] in order to handle some shortcoming of the I-inuence, namely
the fact that there exist weighted (3; 2) games that are not I-complete. When
the number of voters n, is two or three, the strict hierarchy is never achieved.
However, for n  5, the strict hierarchy (1; 1; :::; 1) is achievable. Any hierarchy
with at least four strict relations (that is, ) is achievable. We did not succeed in
determining whether the H-hierarchies (1; 1; 1; 1) and (m; 1; 1) for any m  2 are
achievable or not. The H-hierarchies (1; 1), (1; 2) and (1; 1; 1) are not achievable
meanwhile all other H-hierarchies are achievable.
Even though a complete characterization of achievable I-hierarchies has been
determined, the general question of the characterization of achievableH-hierarchies
is still open. Furthermore, it could be interesting looking for the smallest class
of VGA in which H-hierarchies are achievable. This will lead to renement of
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some results obtained in this paper for H-hierarchies. As mentioned in the intro-
duction, for simple games, Bishnu and Roy [4] have shown how to use minimal
winning coalitions to extract the hierarchy of players. The same techniques could
be investigated for extracting I-hierarchies on one hand and H-hierarchies on the
other hand for voting games with abstention.
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